Why Does Lai Administration Not Have to Pay for Poor Governance？
By Wu Kai-lin, China Times Opinion, August 26, 2026
From The Economist article titled “Taking Taiwan’s democracy hostage,” which claims that the opposition is the source of the erosion of Taiwan’s democracy, to the recent torrential rains and flooding in southern Taiwan, when the premier said he was unable to travel south to inspect the disaster areas because of budget cuts, it is time to stop looking in the wrong places for answers to the question of who has brought Taiwan’s politics to such a trough.
Although “Taking Taiwan’s democracy hostage” was published more than two weeks ago, recent attempts by Taiwan’s president and premier to use local flooding as an opportunity to launch political attacks against the opposition make it necessary to take a closer look at the article’s central question: Who exactly is “taking hostage” Taiwan’s democracy?
The article states, “KMT legislators and their allies held up government budgets for months, including funds for American arms. They have blocked judicial appointments to the constitutional court.” Its author, David Rennie, argues that such bitter political confrontation has left Taiwanese people—especially the younger generation—increasingly disillusioned with politics and less willing to participate.
The argument may appear logical, but it actually confuses cause and effect. Why have the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) repeatedly sought to block the government’s agenda? Ultimately, it is because the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has failed to sufficiently respect the outcome of the 2024 election.
Dissatisfied with the reality of a minority government facing an opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan, the DPP has resorted to motions for reconsideration, judicial review of constitutionality, refusal to countersign legislation, and mass recall campaigns to go after the opposition. Under such pressure, the KMT and TPP have had little choice but to use the Legislative Yuan as their main arena of resistance. Moreover, because their political resources are limited, their actions have often been reactive rather than proactive.
The article also assumes that democracy would function smoothly if the opposition were simply willing to cooperate with the ruling party. Yet the reality is that even after the KMT and TPP passed the central government budget, the DPP continued to disregard resolutions adopted by the legislature. It is evident who is contributing to political disorder and who is responsible for the current deadlock.
Why does the DPP feel it can behave with such impunity? In electoral politics, ruling parties are generally constrained by “performance accountability.” If a government is repeatedly embroiled in policy controversies, governance failures, or political scandals, voters are expected to punish it at the ballot box. Such punishment can even lead to what is known as the “Tacitus Trap”: once a government’s credibility falls sufficiently low, the public may interpret even its correct actions negatively. The administration of President Chen Shui-bian experienced precisely such a process when it became engulfed in corruption scandals.
Yet from the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen to the incumbent under President Lai Ching-te, despite facing intense public criticism over issues ranging from vaccines and the abolition of the death penalty to the Forward-looking Infrastructure Development Program and food safety, the DPP’s support has remained remarkably resilient. For example, following the recent contaminated-oil scandal, several opinion polls still showed President Lai’s approval rating holding steady at around 40 percent. This suggests that the traditional logic of political accountability is gradually losing its force in Taiwan.
The key lies in the DPP’s vigorous promotion of the slogan “resist China and protect Taiwan.” This is more than an electoral strategy; it has enabled “identity politics” to replace “governance politics.” DPP supporters are not unaware of the dangers posed by contaminated oil. Yet under the banner of “resist China to protect Taiwan,” they would rather tolerate such a scandal than withdraw their support for the DPP. Clearly, when party allegiance becomes increasingly intertwined with identity, voters no longer judge political parties solely by the quality of their governance. Instead, the question becomes: “Do you represent the Taiwan with which I identify?”
Once this happens, the ruling party can consolidate its political base relatively easily through identity politics. Rather than going through the difficult process of winning over centrist voters—or even political opponents—through effective governance, it may find it easier to maintain constant political confrontation while waiting for the opposition to fracture, the political landscape to shift, or the external environment to change in ways that help it remain in power.
This structural problem inevitably encourages complacency and a “lie-flat” mentality toward governance, ultimately contributing to the political stalemate Taiwan faces today. More seriously, this problem is not unique to the DPP. Any political party that comes to power could potentially adopt the same course.
(The author is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, United Kingdom.)